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Antibiotic use triggers evolutionary and eco-logical responses from bacteria, leading to antibiotic resistance and harmful patient 
outcomes.1 Two complementary strategies support 
long-term antibiotic effectiveness: conservation of 
existing therapies and production of novel antibiot-
ics.2 Conservation encompasses infection control, 
antibiotic stewardship, and other public health inter-
ventions to prevent infection, which reduce antibiotic 
demand.3 Production of new antibiotics allows physi-
cians to replace existing drugs rendered less effective 
by resistance.4 
In recent years, physicians and policymakers have 
raised concerns about the pipeline for new antibiot-
ics, pointing to a decline in the number of antibiot-
ics approved since the 1980s.5 This trend has been 
attributed to high research and development costs, 
low reimbursement for antibiotics, and regulatory 
standards for review and approval.6 Professional soci-
eties and researchers around the world have called 
for renewed emphasis on antimicrobial stewardship,7 
while also supporting antibiotic research and develop-
ment through grants, changes to intellectual property 
laws to extend market exclusivity periods, and modi-
fication of premarket testing regulations to reduce 
antibiotic development time and expenses.8 In the 
US, these legislative efforts recently culminated with 
the enactment of the Generating Antibiotic Incentives 
Now (GAIN) section of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, which was 
intended to promote the discovery of new antibiotics 
by providing five years of additional market exclusivity 
for new “qualified infectious disease products.”9 The 
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act also created a fast track system to reduce clini-
cal trial development time for breakthrough drugs, 
including new antibiotics.10 The European Union has 
also been active in considering new therapeutic devel-
opment incentives together with other efforts such as 
enhanced antimicrobial stewardship and support for 
basic research.11 
While incentives for antibiotic development may 
hasten the arrival of a larger number of drugs, pub-
lic health will be best served if these new drugs have 
high clinical utility, discrete mechanisms of action 
and narrow spectrums to delay resistance, and well-
defined safety and efficacy profiles.12 In recent years, 
however, there have been numerous high-profile 
examples of approved antibiotics found to have safety 
concerns, including trovafloxacin, which was with-
drawn from the US market, and telithromycin, which 
had two indications withdrawn in self-resolving dis-
eases, but remains available for treatment of commu-
nity-acquired pneumonia despite well-known safety 
issues. Studies reporting simple counts of new anti-
biotic approvals do not adequately consider the clini-
cal impact of the antibiotics — or subsequent safety-
related withdrawals — and therefore may provide 
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an incomplete picture of antibiotic development. To 
better understand recent trends, we analyzed three 
decades of FDA antibiotic approvals, together with 
markers of antibiotic safety and efficacy. To put anti-
biotic trends in context, we compared these results 
with approvals and withdrawals in other drug classes, 
including other antiinfectives. Comparisons to other 
drug classes, such as cardiovascular drugs, can illumi-
nate whether the outcomes of our study are unique to 
antibiotics or are common across several drug classes. 
Comparisons between antibiotics, antivirals and anti-
retrovirals, and other antiinfectives can also identify 
shifts in innovation within the antiinfective therapeu-
tic class. 
Data
Drug Classifications
From publicly available data on the FDA website 
Drugs@FDA,13 we identified all new drug applica-
tions for new molecular entities (NMEs) and new 
biologic license applications (BLAs) approved by the 
FDA from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 
2009. The dates of approval were confirmed using the 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equiva-
lence Evaluations (Orange Book). We then classified 
each drug based on its approved indication into a class 
of the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) clas-
sification system maintained by the WHO Collabo-
rating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology of the 
Norwegian Institute of Public Health.14 “Antiinfectives 
for systemic use” (class J) were further subclassified 
into three categories: “antibiotics for systemic use” 
(subclass J01), “antivirals for systemic use” (subclass 
J05), and “other antiinfectives” (all other subclasses, 
which include antimycotics and vaccines). From the 
same FDA databases, we identified whether each 
drug in our sample was granted priority review or 
orphan drug status by the FDA. Finally, using meth-
ods described by Qureshi et al.,15 we determined which 
NMEs and BLAs were withdrawn from the US market 
as of December 31, 2011. Withdrawals were identified 
in one of three ways: (1) publication by FDA of a notice 
of withdrawal of approval in the Federal Register; (2) 
listing of the product in the Orange Book discontinu-
ation section; or (3) removal of the product from the 
Orange Book approved applications section. 
Characterization of Antibiotic Withdrawals
For all withdrawn drugs in the antibiotic subclass J01, 
we then identified the specific date when these with-
drawn drugs were discontinued from the US market. 
Withdrawal of approval of an antibiotic generates 
a specific announcement by the FDA, as described 
above. However, for some antibiotics, the company 
discontinued widespread sales of the antibiotic many 
years before regulatory withdrawal. Such informal 
discontinuations are rarely accompanied by a formal 
announcement. We therefore defined the date of dis-
continuation as the calendar quarter in which com-
mercial sales in the US dropped below US$100,000, 
using data from IMS MIDAS (data available for 1993-
2009 only). When IMS data were not available, we 
used the date of the official FDA regulatory action. 
We then categorized whether each antibiotic with-
drawal was associated with a safety issue. A safety-
related withdrawal was defined as a withdrawal that 
occurred within a year after new safety-related warn-
ings were added to the drug label, or one described 
as such in regulatory notices published in the Federal 
Register and other government reports, public com-
pany filings with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s EDGAR database, or other announcements 
found in the Westlaw databases. 
Finally, we noted the peak US sales and the sponsor-
ing company for all withdrawn antibiotics. We char-
acterized an antibiotic as “commercially successful” 
if it achieved US sales exceeding $100 million (2010 
dollars) in any calendar year. All data were analyzed 
descriptively.
Studies reporting simple counts of new antibiotic approvals  
do not adequately consider the clinical impact of the antibiotics — or 
subsequent safety-related withdrawals — and therefore may provide an 
incomplete picture of antibiotic development. To better understand recent 
trends, we analyzed three decades of FDA antibiotic approvals, together with 
markers of antibiotic safety and efficacy. To put antibiotic trends in context, 
we compared these results with approvals and withdrawals in other drug 
classes, including other antiinfectives. 
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Results
The FDA approved 815 NMEs and BLAs during the 
study period, with a peak in the late 1990s. We found 
that 35 new drugs in the class of antiinfectives were 
approved in the 1980s (16% of all drug approvals), 
as compared to 49 in the 1990s (15%), and 27 (11%) 
in the 2000s. Among the subclass of antibiotics, 61 
NMEs were approved overall, with the greatest num-
ber approved in the 1980s (29, 13% of all drug approv-
als), fewer in the 1990s (23, 7%) and still fewer the 
2000s (9, 4%). Among the subclass of antivirals, 38 
were approved overall, with the most in the 1990s (21, 
6% of all drug approvals) and 2000s (13, 5%), and 
the least in the 1980s (4, 2%) (Exhibit 1). A majority 
of these antivirals were antiretroviral drugs for HIV 
(n=24). Other antiinfective drug approvals totaled 2 in 
the 1980s, 5 in the 1990s, and 5 in the 2000s, mainly 
antimycotics and antimycobacterials (n=11 out of 12).
By comparison, during this time period, cardiovas-
cular drugs had the largest number of NME approvals 
in the 1980s (40, 18%), although the number of new 
cardiovascular drugs fell in the 1990s (39, 12%) and 
2000s (18, 7%). Antineoplastic and immunomodulat-
ing agents showed a different trajectory, with fewer 
NME approvals in the 1980s (13, 6%), but becom-
ing the largest therapeutic class for new approvals in 
the 1990s (52, 15%) and 2000s (51, 20%) (Exhibit 2). 
Overall, the number of approvals in all classes peaked 
in the 1990s but improved slightly from the 1980s to 
the 2000s (1980s=225; 1990s=339; 2000s=251). 
Regulatory Classification of Antiinfectives
In our study period, the FDA approved 57 antiinfec-
tives after priority review (1980s=16 (16% of all prior-
ity reviews), 1990s=24 (18%), 2000s=17 (20%)). Thus, 
antiinfectives as a class claimed an increasing share of 
all priority review approvals over time. Within the two 
largest antiinfective subclasses, priority review antibi-
otics fell sharply after the 1980s (1980s=11 (11% of all 
priority reviews), 1990s=3 (2%), 2000s=3 (4%)), while 
priority review antivirals grew dramatically to a peak 
in the 1990s (1980s=3 (3% of all priority reviews), 
1990s=17 (13%), 2000s=11 (13%)), most of which were 
antiretrovirals for HIV (n=22) (Exhibit 3). Overall, 51% 
of approved antiinfectives and 28% of approved anti-
biotics received priority review, compared to 37% of 
drugs approved in all other therapeutic classes. 
Orphan drug designation was given at the time of 
initial FDA approval to 3 antiretrovirals and 3 other 
antiinfectives during our study period, but none were 
given to antibiotics. By comparison, 153 drugs overall 
received orphan drug designation, representing 20% 
of all drugs approved after 1983.
Withdrawn Antibiotics
Among the 61 NME approved antibiotics, 26 were 
withdrawn (43%), a rate far higher than was observed 
among non-antibiotics (13%). The 26 withdrawn 
antibiotics are described in Exhibit 4. The mean date 
from approval to withdrawal was 15 years (inter-
quartile range: 9-19 years). Withdrawals for safety-
related reasons (n=6) generally occurred sooner after 
approval, from 4 to 76 months after approval (mean: 
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Exhibit 1  
FDA Approvals of New Systemic Antiinfectives, by Class and Subclasses, 1980-2009 
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Exhibit 2  
FDA Approvals of New Drugs, Percent of Totals, by ATC Class, 1980-2009 
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33 months). Withdrawals were greatest for drugs 
approved in the years 1980-1984 (71%) and lowest for 
drugs approved in the years 1985-1989 (33%). None of 
the antibiotics approved in the 2000s was withdrawn 
as of August 1, 2013.
Only 2 withdrawn antibiotics received priority 
review designation at initial approval (moxalactam 
and cefonicid). Few of the withdrawn antibiotics 
were commercially successful (n=3, although com-
mercial sales data were available for 1993-2009 only) 
and most were discontinued from the market several 
years before formal withdrawal. Withdrawn antibiot-
ics were concentrated among cephalosporins (n=10) 
and fluoroquinolones (n=9). Six of the 26 (23%) with-
drawn antibiotics were safety-related withdrawals, 
all of them fluoroquinolones approved in the 1990s: 
temafloxacin (approved in 1992), sparfloxacin (1996), 
alatrofloxacin (1997), trovafloxacin (1997), grepafloxa-
cin (1997), and gatifloxacin (1999).16 
After adjusting for withdrawals, the data for net 
FDA approvals of antibiotics, antivirals, and other 
antiinfectives are shown in Exhibit 5. Amongst anti-
biotics not withdrawn as of August 1, 2013, 13 were 
approved in the 1980s, 13 in the 1990s, and 9 in the 
2000s. For antivirals not withdrawn as of August 1, 
2013, 4 were approved in the 1980s, 19 in the 1990s, 
and 13 in the 2000s. For other antiinfectives not with-
drawn as of August 1, 2013, 2 were approved in the 
1980s, 5 in the 1990s, and 5 in the 2000s. 
Discussion 
This review of antiinfective approvals and withdraw-
als suggests that reports warning of a decrease in anti-
biotic approvals over time and current-day nadir in 
antibiotic approvals may be overstated. Simple enu-
meration of annual drug approvals says little about 
clinical impact. Withdrawal from the market is one ex 
post indicator of modest clinical impact. After adjust-
ing for products withdrawn from the market, net anti-
biotic introductions over the past three decades have 
declined at a slower rate than previously reported, 
while antivirals and other antiinfectives demonstrate 
even more favorable trends by comparison.
Our data on antibiotic withdrawals have impor-
tant policy implications for efforts to incentivize new 
antibiotic development. Withdrawals among anti-
biotics in our sample occurred at more than triple 
the rate of all other drugs. One explanation for this 
high withdrawal rate is the substantial num-
ber of follow-on products approved. In our 
sample, most withdrawn antibiotics could 
be generally characterized as secondary or 
tertiary (or later) drugs in one of two impor-
tant drug classes: cephalosporins (n=10) 
and fluoroquinolones (n=9). For example, 
most of the withdrawn cephalosporins were 
approved after the introduction of commer-
cially successful first, second, and third gen-
eration classes of cephalosporins by other 
companies (cefadroxil in 1978; cefuroxime in 1987; 
and ceftriaxone in 1984). Eight of the 9 withdrawn 
fluoroquinolones were approved after Bayer intro-
duced the blockbuster ciprofloxacin in 1987. To our 
knowledge, none of the drugs were withdrawn due to 
emergence of significant antibiotic resistance, as suc-
cessful drugs with similar resistance profiles remain 
marketed and widely used. Many antibiotics are 
approved on the basis of non-inferiority trials, whose 
primary hypothesis is to rule out how much worse 
a new antibiotic might be compared to an older 
antibiotic.17 Therefore these studies do not directly 
measure whether new antibiotics have additional 
benefits over currently approved therapies. While 
such sequential innovation can sometimes bring bet-
ter drugs to market, the high number of sequential 
innovations later withdrawn after poor sales suggests 
low levels of clinical significance for these drugs. In a 
recent review, Pulcini et al. identified 33 “forgotten” 
antibiotics with potentially significant clinical value, 
but amongst the 26 withdrawn antibiotics, only cefo-
perazone appears on their list, and only in combina-
tion form with sulbactam.18
Priority review status is one ex ante indicator of 
expected clinical value.19 We found that as a class, 
antiinfectives had more priority review drug approv-
als than average, with an increasing rate during the 
past three decades. Over time, priority reviews in 
the antiinfective class have shifted from antibiotics 
to antivirals (including antiretrovirals). Few priority 
review antibiotics were subsequently withdrawn, and 
none for safety-related reasons. It therefore makes 
sense to focus antibiotic development incentive pro-
grams on particularly novel products that might qual-
ify for priority review. Notably, the GAIN language in 
the recent Food and Drug Administration Safety and 
Innovation Act limits its applicability to “serious and 
life-threatening conditions,”20 which is promising, but 
This review of antiinfective approvals and 
withdrawals suggests that reports warning 
of a decrease in antibiotic approvals over 
time and current-day nadir in antibiotic 
approvals may be overstated. 
institutional corruption and the pharmaceutical industry • fall 2013 693
Outterson, Powers, Seoane-Vazquez, Rodriguez-Monguio, and Kesselheim
Generic Name Antibiotic class 
Approval 
year Withdrawal or Discontinuation Dates
Bacampicillin Penicillin with extended spectrum 1980 Withdrawn from Drug Product List Feb 2006; discontin-
ued before 1Q 1993
Cinoxacin Fluoroquinolone 1980 Withdrawn as not marketed (Dec 2007); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Sisomicin Aminoglycoside 1980 Withdrawn as not marketed (ANDA, Nov 1995); discon-
tinued before 1Q 1993
Mezlocillin Penicillin with extended spectrum 1981 Withdrawn as not marketed (ANDA, Feb 2002) (NDA,  
Mar 2005); discontinued 4Q 1999
Moxalactam Third-generation cephalosporin 1981* Withdrawn as not marketed (Oct 1996)
Azlocillin Penicillin with extended spectrum 1982 Withdrawn by FDA as not marketed (Sept 1997); discon-
tinued before 1Q 1993
Cefoperazone Third-generation cephalosporin 1982 Withdrawn from the Drug Product List in June 2008;  
discontinued 2Q 2002 
Ceftizoxime Third-generation cephalosporin 1983 Withdrawn as not marketed (Sept 1997); discontinued  
2Q 2007
Netilmicin Aminoglycoside 1983 Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Amdinocillin Penicillin with extended spectrum 1984 Withdrawn as not marketed (Oct 1996); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Cefonicid Second-generation cephalosporin 1984* Withdrawn as no longer marketed (Feb 2002); discontin-
ued 4Q 1998
Ceforanide Second-generation cephalosporin 1984 Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Cefmenoxime Third-generation cephalosporin 1987 Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Cefotiam Second-generation cephalosporin 1988 Withdrawn as not marketed (June 1997); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Cefmetazole Second-generation cephalosporin 1989 Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2001); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Cefpiramide Third-generation cephalosporin 1989 Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued  
before 1Q 1993
Enoxacin Fluoroquinolone 1991 Withdrawn as not marketed (Mar 2005); discontinued  
before Dec. 31, 1997 
Loracarbef Second-generation cephalosporin 1991 ∞ Withdrawn 2006; discontinued 2Q 2006
Lomefloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1992 Withdrawn from Drug Product List, June 2008; withdrawn 
as not marketed (May 2009); discontinued 2Q 2001
Temafloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1992 † Withdrawn June 1992; discontinued 2Q 1992
Dirithromycin Macrolide 1995 Withdrawn as no longer marketed (Nov 2007); discontin-
ued 1Q 2004
Sparfloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1996 † Withdrawn as not marketed (Mar 2005); discontinued 4Q 
2000
Alatrofloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1997 † Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued 4Q 
2000
Trovafloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1997 † ∞ Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued 4Q 
2000
Grepafloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1997 † Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2007); discontinued 4Q 
1999
Gatifloxacin Fluoroquinolone 1999 † ∞ Withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness (Sept 
2008); discontinued 3Q 2006 
* Granted priority review
† Safety-related withdrawal
∞ Commercially-successful (1993-2009 data only)
Source:  Authors’ analysis and IMS MIDAS, January 1993-December 2009, IMS Health Incorporated. 
Exhibit 4 
New Systemic Antibiotics Approved by the FDA 1980-2009, but Subsequently Withdrawn or Discontinued
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is by definition more inclusive than the priority review 
program, which is reserved for drugs treating a serious 
or life-threatening condition that offer patients a sig-
nificant improvement in safety or effectiveness com-
pared to available therapies. 
We found that trends in the rate of antiinfec-
tive approvals were comparable to those of other 
drug classes. For example, while the relative share of 
approved antiinfective drugs declined, we found that 
several other classes faced an even sharper drop, includ-
ing drugs for the cardiovascular system, musculoskel-
etal system, and skin. In particular, the cardiovascular 
results are inconsistent with the oft-repeated complaint 
that antibiotics are uniquely disadvantaged because the 
course of treatment is short, as compared to long-term 
maintenance drugs such as those intended to treat high 
cholesterol or hypertension.21 By contrast, the rates of 
approval of antineoplastic and immunomodulating 
agents rose substantially, despite the relatively short 
courses of therapy they often require. Reasons for the 
growth in antineoplastic drugs may relate to allocations 
in government funding for basic research, relative sci-
entific progress in therapeutic categories, unmet clini-
cal needs, and the fact that reimbursement levels for 
cancer drugs have been robust. Indeed, the revenues 
associated with recent antineoplastic drug development 
has led commentators to suggest enhancing antibiotic 
reimbursement as a way of promoting research in this 
area, including through delinkage mechanisms such as 
value-based reimbursement and goal-oriented prizes 
that reward innovation delinked from unit sales.22 
Finally, our data support the hypothesis that inno-
vation within the antiinfective class shifted from 
antibiotics to antivirals and antiretrovirals in the last 
two decades. Given the magnitude of the global HIV/
AIDS epidemic, such a shift might be considered 
appropriate. 
This study has several limitations. The data are 
limited to NMEs and BLAs, excluding approvals of 
generic drugs and brand-name drug approvals that 
are not NMEs. The designation of safety-related 
withdrawals might be over-inclusive. The literature 
lacks a clear definition of safety-related withdraw-
als for antibiotics.23 Some researchers have relied 
on the CDER Annual Reports to exhaustively define 
the universe of safety-related withdrawals, but these 
reports rely on agency self-identification of error 
and may miss subsequent safety-related antibiotic 
withdrawals. Our designation of safety-related with-
drawals might also be under-inclusive. We excluded 
some withdrawn antibiotics despite known safety 
issues because the safety issue was not closely enough 
associated in time to the withdrawal. For example, 
moxalactam received serious safety warnings but 
continued with diminished sales for several years 
before being taken off the market, and was therefore 
not considered a safety-related withdrawal. Bleeding 
concerns also are noted in the medical literature with 
cefoperazone and cefmetazole.24 Phototoxicity and 
 20 
 
Exhibit 5   
New Systemic Antiinfectives Not Withdrawn in the U.S. as of August 1, 2013, by Decade of 
FDA Approval, 1980-2009 
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central nervous system effects have been noted with 
lomefloxacin.25 Some antibiotics that were not com-
pletely withdrawn had specific indications withdrawn 
such as telithromycin for acute bacterial sinusitis and 
acute exacerbations of chronic bronchitis due to lack 
of evidence of efficacy as well as adverse effects. In 
addition, the withdrawal data were right censored 
because we could not capture potential future with-
drawals. For example, we did not treat telithromycin 
as withdrawn since it remained on the market at the 
time of our analysis although with decreasing usage 
it may be completely withdrawn in the future. Finally, 
while the data are analyzed only descriptively, that is 
consistent with the existing literature on trends in 
antibiotic approvals.
In conclusion, we found that simple numerical 
declines in antibiotic approvals give an incomplete 
picture of drug innovation. Drug approvals are down 
in many classes, including cardiovascular drugs, so 
the observed trend may have little to do with anti-
biotics per se. Nor should policymakers emphasize 
simple numeric targets without careful focus on the 
potential clinical value of newly approved agents and 
their demonstrated benefits over currently available 
therapies. Numerous antibiotics have suffered from 
problems after approval, including withdrawals, 
safety-related withdrawals, and a lack of clinical or 
commercial significance. While there is certainly a 
need for new antibiotic products to combat evolving 
resistance among bacteria, policies seeking to rem-
edy a perceived lack of antibiotic innovation should 
focus on drug quality, not just quantity. The histori-
cal data presented here provides evidence that sim-
ply emphasizing faster approval of antibiotics based 
on more limited clinical evidence or stronger intel-
lectual property rights may encourage the approval 
of products that have limited clinical impact or are 
subsequently withdrawn from the marketplace for 
safety or other reasons. Neither represents the type 
of antibiotic innovation needed today.
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